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This article develops a conceptual framework on civil society that
shifts the dominant focus on individuals to collectiveactionevents—
civic and protest alike—that bring people together in public to re-
alize a common purpose. Analyzing over 4,000 events in the Chicago
area from 1970 to 2000, the authors ﬁnd that while civic engagement
is durable overall, “sixties-style” protest declines, and hybrid events
that combine public claims making with civic forms of behavior—
what they call “blended socialaction”—increase.Furthermore,dense
social ties, group memberships, and neighborly exchange do not
predict community variations in collective action. The density of
nonproﬁt organizations matters instead, suggesting that declines in
traditional social capital may not be as consequential for civic ca-
pacity as commonly thought.
The reigning image of American civic life in both the popular and schol-
arly press is largely bleak. Across a wide spectrum of commentators, the
dominant view is that participation in collective aspects of civic life has
plummeted dramatically over the last three decades. Indeed, whether the
indicator is decline in voting, reduced trust in government, lower mem-
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bership in the parent-teacher association, or slipping attendance at public
meetings, Americans have been famously said to be “bowling alone” more
than ever (Putnam 1995, 2000).
Of course, not all hold to this view. The most common dissent from
the narrative of civic decline turns on a quarrel with the numbers. Using
one of the same national surveys as Putnam does (2000, esp. chaps. 3, 4,
6, and the appendix), some observers have argued that individuals have
not, in fact, declined in certain forms of institutional trust and traditional
organizational memberships (Paxton 1999; Rotolo 1999). Others have ar-
gued that the organizational locus of civic engagement is what has
changed—that Americans have turned to looser but still effective asso-
ciations in the form of social support or self-help organizations (Wuthnow
1998; Ray 2002). Still other critics contend that American civic life, which
was formerly organized around traditional membership-based voluntary
associations, has been restructured around membership in advocacy or-
ganizations and other professional civic groups (Skocpol 2003, 2004).
The positions of Putnam and his critics each have merit but tend to
reinforce the way in which the debate on civil society has unfolded. Most
of the data in dispute turn on trends in the individual-level backdrop to
civic society—especially declines in group membership and social-psy-
chological states of trust—rather than collective political action or public
civic events. Why should we care about the prevalence of membership
in the Elks Club, PTA, or any other group, unless it translates into col-
lective civic action? Is it important that fewer people trust “generalized
others” or attend regular meetings? Does this tell us about the capacity
of collectivities to act?
2 The alarm bells that Putnam (1995) set off had
little to do with bowling club memberships per se or the local Order of
the Moose. Relying on Tocqueville’s classic insights from the 1800s, po-
litical theorists and social critics have been most concerned with the neg-
ative consequences of civic disengagement for democratic capacity and
the health of the American polity.
3 From this concern, it follows that the
civil society debate has been waged on the potentially misleading per-
2 The typical assumption is that higher levels of general mistrust lead to greater dis-
engagement, e.g., as measured by voting turnout. As events such as the 2003 guber-
natorial recall in California reveal, however, it may be the case that a distrustful
citizenry is more, not less, likely to become involved in civic affairs.
3 For Tocqueville (2000), the other reason to care about civic participation is because
it presumably increases the tendency of individuals to be other regarding. That is,
civic participation was thought to increase identiﬁcation with collective interests and
the common good. Whether or not this is true,wesetasidethemoresocial-psychological
interpretation of the role of civic participation. For excellent recent reviews of studies
of individual participation, see Putnam (2000), Oliver (2001), and Ray (2002); for trust,
see Paxton (1999).Collective Civic Action
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ceptions, memberships, and behaviors of individuals as opposed to truly
social, or collective, action.
In an attempt to address this theoretical disconnect, our project turns
its attention to robust civic action in the form of collective public events.
Drawing on insights and lessons learned in the social movements litera-
ture, we gathered a sample of over 4,000 collective action events in the
Chicago metropolitan area—both civic participation and protests—for
selected years from 1970 to 2000. Through detailed coding of these events
we constructed what we believe is a novel database that allows us to
chart the variable nature and community structure of collective action in
a major urban area during the period of rising concern over American
civic decline. In shifting the focus from individuals to public events that
bring two or more people together to realize a common purpose or speciﬁc
claim, we ﬁnd considerable temporal continuity in civic engagement.
Namely, the volume of collective civic events is remarkably stable from
1970 to 2000, as are the rank orderings of public claims and forms of
events. At the same time, we discover the growth of a previously over-
looked phenomenon that combines protest with traditional civic behav-
ior—what we call “blended social action.” Our analysis also provides
evidence that interindividual social ties and membership in traditional
civic groups are not good predictors of collective action. This article thus
reframes the civil society debate in terms of collective, rather than indi-
vidual, action: we speciﬁcally argue that collective civic engagement ap-
pears to have changed rather than declined, with sources that are orga-
nizational rather than interpersonal in nature.
FROM PROTEST TO COLLECTIVE CIVIC PARTICIPATION
There are discernible biases in the literature on social movements that
have undercut its contribution to the civic society debate. From our per-
spective, movement scholars have tended to privilege a rather narrow,
stylized form of contention—featuring disruptive protest linked to broad
national struggles waged by disadvantaged minorities—over far more
numerous, if less visible, kinds of collective engagement (McAdam et al.
2005). One of the goals of this article is to grant greater empiricalattention
to “mundane” but no less important forms of collective civic action.
Fortunately, social movement scholarship offers important building
blocks that can be used to transcend its traditional focus. One of the
strengths of research in social movements is the decisive empirical shift
from individual civic participation to a focus on collective action events,
which logically, we argue, is essential to the underlying phenomenon at
the heart of the civil society debate. A second contribution concerns theAmerican Journal of Sociology
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honing of a methodology consistent with an event-based focus, a point
we elaborate further below. A third contribution, more theoretical in na-
ture, concerns the central importance assigned by movement analysts to
an understanding of the social processes that give rise to and help sustain
collective mobilization and action (e.g., Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994;
Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Gould 1995; Tarrow 1998; McAdam
[1982] 1999, 2003; Mische 2003), an intellectual move that rejects the idea
that collective action results simply from the aggregation of individual
civic behavior.
Recent work on the differential social organization of urban commu-
nities also bears on our theoretical understanding of the conditions under
which collective capacity emerges and is built. Focusing on neighborhood
residents, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) argue that the linkage
of a working trust with shared expectations for intervening on behalf of
the common good deﬁnes the spatial context of what they term collective
efﬁcacy. Just as self-efﬁcacy is situated rather than global—one has self-
efﬁcacy relative to a particular task—a neighborhood’s efﬁcacy exists
relative to speciﬁc tasks such as maintaining public order and providing
local services. Whether garbage removal, the siting of a ﬁre station, school
improvements, or police response, a continuous stream of challenges faces
residents of modern communities. No longer can such challenges be met
by relying on strong ties among neighbors, for the evidence is clear that
friends and social support networks are decreasingly organized in a pa-
rochial, local fashion (e.g., Fischer 1982). Moving away from a narrow
focus on private ties and personal memberships, the concept of collective
efﬁcacy is meant to signify an emphasis on conjoint capability for action
to achieve an intended effect, and hence an active sense of collective
engagement on the part of residents to solve problems. Collective efﬁcacy
is best observed under conditions of challenge, reinforcing the idea that
resolving conﬂict is an important part of civic engagement.
Social movements and collective efﬁcacy theory thus share a common
orienting framework—a focus on the mobilization of action for an in-
tended purpose. We draw on this framework to argue for a direct focus
on civic events that are collective in nature and that bring together mem-
bers of the community. Events such as blood drives, community festivals,
fund-raisers, and community watches against crime go straight to the
heart of civic capacity. Like protest events, such civic events may seek
to procure resources. However, civic events expressing community-
oriented or collective interests typically do not represent a challenge to
the existing system. Rather, many such events can be said to “celebrate
community”—whether pancake breakfasts at the local ﬁre hall, fund-
raisers for cultural causes, ethnic festivals, or neighborhood block parties.
The collective and spatial nature of such phenomena has been sur-Collective Civic Action
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prisingly overlooked in priorresearch.Thesocialcapitaldebatehasturned
on national trends in things like group membership, social ties, trust,
leisure, voting, routine meeting attendance, giving, and television viewing
(e.g., Putnam 2000, pp. 426–39), rather than directly on collective civic
events in community context. The collective efﬁcacy literature is sensitive
to neighborhood context and the idea of collective events, but it, too,
omits events and relies on survey questions about trust and expectations
(Sampson et al. 1997, pp. 919–20). The social movementsliteraturefocuses
on nonroutine events but eschews much concern for neighborhood var-
iation and concentrates on explicit “protest” agendas such as the antiwar,
civil rights, labor, and environmental movements. Although theseagendas
are each important in their own right, we seek to leverage a more general
conception of collective civic action. We do so by borrowing different
elements of each theoretical approach, ﬁrst by replacing the individual-
level focus of most social capital arguments with an event-basedapproach
to examining collective civic behavior. Next, we adopt the task-oriented
and geographically bounded framework of collective efﬁcacy. Finally, we
expand the protest agenda of traditional social movement research by
including an explicit focus on collective civic events.
We accomplish theseobjectivesbyexaminingtemporalandcommunity-
level variations in both collective civic action and protest in a major
metropolitan region. Because this is the ﬁrst such effort of which we are
aware to directly measure collective civic action events and situate them
simultaneously in time and space along with protest, our empirical as-
sessment highlights basic trends, patterns, and predictors. We ask three
broad sets of questions to orient our analysis:
1. What is the nature of collective civic behavior over time? Is it de-
clining, stable, or possibly even increasing? What is the relationship
of protest to civic engagement?
2. What are the claims or purposes of collectivecivicactionandprotest?
Are they aimed at producing public goods? Have collective claims
changed over time, and if so, how?
3. Perhaps most important, what are the predictors of collective civic
action at the community level? Does membership in traditionalsocial
capital organizations predict civic action events, or is institutional
structure more important?
SOCIAL APPROPRIATION AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS
So far we have not made an explicit theoretical link between the social
organization of communities and political action, but neither has muchAmerican Journal of Sociology
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past work. Social capital theory, in particular, tends to gloss over the
mechanisms by which bowling leagues and group membership lead to
generalized civic capacity. Reasonable stories can be told about how social
exchange within groups leads to political awareness, building community
capacity, and political mobilization, but inferences are usually indirect,
and the evidence sometimes negative (Kaufman 2003). By combining one
strand of social movement research with recent workoncollectiveefﬁcacy,
we derive testable hypotheses about the conditionsthatfacilitatecollective
civic action. We propose that these conditions go beyond the kinds of
social participation stressed to date.
We start with one consistent ﬁnding from the social movement litera-
ture: episodes of contention tend to develop within establishedinstitutions
or organizations (for a summary of this literature, see McCarthy 1996).
Besides well-known studies that helped establish thefact(e.g.,Orum1972;
Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Morris 1984;
McAdam 1999), a host of more recent works have conﬁrmed it in new
and creative ways. For example, in his work on the 1989 Chinese student
movement, Zhao (1998) shows how the dense ecology of college campuses
in Beijing served as the locus of initial mobilization. Glenn (2001), among
others, documents the role that a network of independent theater com-
panies played in the origins of the Civic Forum Movement in Czecho-
slovakia. Osa (1997) highlights the central structural importance of the
Catholic Church to Solidarity and the larger dissident movement in
Poland.
Consistent with these studies, proponents of the political process model
of social movement emergence have long emphasized the role of estab-
lished institutions or organizations in the onset of contention. “Absent any
such ‘mobilizing structure,’ incipient movements [are] thought to lack the
capacity to act even if afforded the opportunity to do so” (McAdam 2003,
p. 289). As straightforward and seemingly self-evident as this proposition
is, it is worth reiterating that the emphasis is conceptually different from
claims that turn on rates of individual participation in voluntary asso-
ciations and related civic activities as emphasized in the social capital
literature. The main difference of note is that movements and related
protest events are not just aggregations of individual participants; rather,
they are social products born of complex interactive dynamics played out
within established social settings. Recently, movement theorists have
sought to soften the structurally determinist tone of the earliest work in
this tradition and to move instead to identify the contingent social and
cultural processes that serve to transform established institutions intosites
of emergent contention (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
2001). Termed “social appropriation” by movement theorists, this trans-
formative process is thought to depend on, among other factors, “attri-Collective Civic Action
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butions of threat or opportunity,” the adoption of innovative action forms,
and/or a shared sense of efﬁcacy among group members. The last factor
speaks directly to collective efﬁcacy theory and, more generally, to recent
work on community-level processes and dynamics (Sampson, Morenoff,
and Gannon 2002).
Drawing on these different strands of work, we hypothesize that col-
lective action events in the modern city are highly concentratedgeograph-
ically and explained by systematic variations in community-level char-
acteristics. Wuthnow (1998, p. 112), like Wilson (1987), argues that the
new urban poverty is deﬁned increasingly in terms of its geographic con-
centration, and therefore that “the character of civic involvement must
beunderstood in termsofthesocialecologyofentireneighborhoods,rather
than as an attribute of individuals or families alone.” We agree, but note
that restricting the focus to poor neighborhoods and concentrated poverty
as the main contributor to declining mobilization is an analyticallynarrow
approach. As noted, the dominant counterperspective on civic decline
poses a different kind of thesis, whereby the density of local ties and
memberships in local voluntary associations and organized groups con-
stitute the main force generating civic action, a force that has systemat-
ically declined (e.g., Putnam 2000). In many ways, this idea harkens back
to classic themes in the literature on urban voluntary associations and
personal networks (e.g., Komarovsky 1946; Fischer 1982) as a source of
collective capacity.
Rather than poverty or civic memberships, we emphasize the propo-
sition that the capacity for sustained collective action is conditioned
mainly by the presence of established institutions and organizations that
may be appropriated in the service of emergent action. High rates of
individual participation and dense personal ties may well be related to
this kind of infrastructure, but conceptually, they are not the same thing.
Imagine, for example, an “urban village” with intense participation by its
residents in only one local organization, compared to another community
with a lower prevalence of memberships spread across a multiplicity of
institutions. Moreover, when membership and institutional density are
coincident, it would seem that high rates of individual participation are
an outgrowth of the existing organizational structure, not the reverse. In
the same way, we see emergent collective action more as a product of
extant institutions and organizations (or, more accurately, speciﬁed pro-
cesses that take place within them) than of the levels of individual par-
ticipation that attach to these structures. Adjusting for key confounders
that may also bear on mobilization capacity, such as the concentration of
economic resources and racial composition, we therefore compare the
predictive power of aggregated civic memberships with a more institu-American Journal of Sociology
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tionally based explanation rooted in the density of local organizational
structures.
Emergence of Blended Forms of Action
Our integration of the social movements and urban community literature
suggests a further twist to the social capital–civic society debate. The
insight we glean is to view forms of protest not as inherently problematic,
but as potentially part of building community. Protest, after all, is a form
of collective action that Tocqueville (2000) himself might have admired
for its democratic underpinnings. Putnam seems to agree: “Whether
among gays marching in San Francisco or evangelicals praying on the
Mall or, in an earlier era, autoworkers downing tools in Flint, the act of
collective protest itself creates enduring bondsofsolidarity”(2000,p.153).
4
Along these lines, a recent analysis of democracy by the political scientist
Eric Oliver claims that social conﬂict and civic engagement have a sym-
biotic relationship in a well-functioning democracy (2001, p. 202).
We thus take the step of conceptualizing a largely unrecognized but
potentially transformative type of activity. Quite simply, we marry the
metaphorical bowling league to civic action by examining events that
combine traditional community “togetherness” (e.g., community festivals)
with claims for social change. Consider, for example, an event reported
in the Chicago Tribune under the headline: “Spearheads Playground Bat-
tle: Community Group Demands Playground Facilities for Youth at Park
District.” This article describes a collective event in which a community
action group called Let’s All Get Together and Work attended a meeting
of the Park District to demand that a vacant lot be converted to a play-
ground for neighborhood children. Or consider another event reported
under the headline: “Neighbors’ Library Plea Is Granted: Community
Residents and Students Lobby for Temporary Library Facility.” In this
event, community residents and a group of middle-school students at-
tended a board meeting of the public library to request that a temporary
library site be found to service the community during the two years it
would take to restore the neighborhood library destroyed by ﬁre.
These two hybrid events represent examples of what we call “blended
social action.” This form of collective action blurs traditional boundaries
by combining common types of civic participation, such as festivals or
neighborhood association meetings, with a stated claim and an organized
4 Putnam (2000) disagrees, however, that “checkbook” membership in groups like
Greenpeace or the Sierra Club achieves the same ends. Here we side with Putnam by
looking at types of collective acts he acknowledges as theoretically relevant but does
not study empirically.Collective Civic Action
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public event that seeks change. In other words, hybrid collective events
typically combine protestlike “claims” for change with civil society
“forms.”
5 Consider that the successful library protest noted above origi-
nated in the context of a neighborhood association. Rather than assuming
that membership in such a neighborhood form of organization triggers
social action, we look instead to concrete public claims and collective
action itself. Such blended events, neither wholly civic nor wholly protest
in nature, provide a potential key to understanding the seeming paradox
of decline in traditional civic memberships amidst durability in collective
civic engagement.
Our hypothesis that blended forms of social action constitute an in-
creasing form of collective civic action in the United States is further
motivated by the fact that community-based nonproﬁt organizations have
grown over time and have become increasingly embedded in the political
process through the mediation of publicly funded services (Marwell2004).
An intriguing body of research also suggeststhepotentialoflocalnonproﬁt
organizations to foster collective action (Small 2004; Warren 2004) and
to correct for market or government “failures” in the production of public
goods (Hansmann 1987; Weisbrod 1988; Berry 2003).
6
In short, a focus on community-based organizational structures, espe-
cially nonproﬁt organizations, uniﬁes our dual concern with temporal
trends and cross-community variations. Temporal change is seen from the
lens of a changing organizational form, and the concentrationoftheevents
themselves is theorized as rooted in the density of organizational
infrastructures.
THE CHICAGO COLLECTIVE CIVIC PARTICIPATION STUDY (CCCP)
Our data consists of detailed information collected over four years on
collective events occurring in the Chicago metropolitan areabetween1970
and 2000. Chicago was chosen not only because of its status as a large
5 Maney and Oliver (2001, p. 148) argue something similar with respect to form: “Some
protest messages are delivered through nonprotest forms such as ceremonies. . . . As
the standard protest forms become legal and normative, they can carry nonprotest
educational and awareness content.” At the national level, Skocpol’s (2004) recent
work also points to the increasingly hybridized form of social action that stems from
the professionalization of large-scale voluntary, nonproﬁt, and interest group organi-
zations (see also Berry 2003).
6 Marwell (2004) further argues that nonproﬁt community-based organizations are em-
bedded in a network of political and economic exchange that can leverage the interests
and voting power of their clients. Although she focuses on individual voting, from our
perspective, this networking process in principle has the capacity to generate a variety
of collective events, creating an “externality” of collective civic engagement.American Journal of Sociology
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and important metropolis, but also because it afforded a unique oppor-
tunity to leverage an ongoing study of the city’s neighborhoods (described
below). We collected event data by extending a well-established meth-
odology of social movement research—gathering and coding reports of
protest events from newspaper archives (Earl et al. 2004). We selected
the Chicago Tribune as the main newspaper of record because it has the
largest circulation and is by consensus accounts the most inﬂuential news-
paper in the Chicago area (see also Suttles 1990).
Collection of newspaper data has typically relied on keyword searches
of newspaper indices (e.g., Lieberson and Silverman 1965; Gurr 1968;
Olzak 1989). Another approach to event identiﬁcation involves reading
the entire newspaper, page by page, searching for candidate events (e.g.,
McAdam and Su 2002). Although more time consuming, we chose the
latter approach because we sought to collect all forms of collective civic
action, not just the highly visible protest events. Pretesting suggested that
selecting events through a keyword search of the newspaper index failed
to yield the broad types of collective action events of theoretical interest.
To maximize resources and cover as long a temporal frame as possible,
we sampled every third day of a given year rather than reading the
newspaper every day of the week (see also Kriesi et al. 1995). With this
strategy, no one day is privileged, and we were able to cover threedecades’
worth of events.
7 The event identiﬁcation process was identical for each
day that events were collected. For example, there was no samplingwithin
newspaper sections across days. This identical process ensured that data
were collected from a representative sample of newspaper sections, days
of the week, and days of the month across all the years of our study.
Collective Public Events
Our event identiﬁcation relied on ﬁve primary criteria to distinguish ar-
ticles that reported collective action events from other news stories, ar-
ticles, and listings. First, prospective events had to be public. Second,
they had to involve two or more individuals (though usually more). Third,
we only collected events with a discrete time occurrence that could be
identiﬁed within a two-week time window on either side of the newspaper
7 Sampling was continuous over the period of study. Thus data collection did not
necessarily begin with the ﬁrst calendar day of the year but rather with the date that
was three days after the last date coded in the previous year.Collective Civic Action
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date.
8 Fourth, we excluded routine political activity initiated by the state
or formal political parties (e.g., political party dinners, speeches, and ral-
lies). Such regular or ongoing political activity does not arise from emer-
gent claims making or civic capacity of citizens, but develops insteadfrom
the initiative of political actors and professionals. Typical examples would
be a speech by a mayoral candidate, a regular city council meeting, or a
party-sponsored rally held for a state senator.
9 Furthermore, routine po-
litical lobbying by groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving or the
Sierra Club, while important, is continuous in nature and does not ﬁt
with our deﬁnition of discrete events of civic participation. Finally, we
excluded proﬁt-oriented events and regularly scheduled gatherings that
are typical fare in any large city, such as professional sports games, live
entertainment (e.g., rock concerts, theater), school swim meets, church
services, university classes, and meetings of self-help groups such as Al-
coholics Anonymous or weight-loss groups.
10 Self-help groups, classes,and
regular public meetings initiated by professionals or as part of an orga-
nization’s mandate—like routine political activity—do not provide what
we argue is a direct indicator of collective civic action or capacity.
11
Event Coding
Trained project personnel systematically read each page of the Tribune,
collecting all articles for coding that contained a collective public event
per the above criteria. Once event identiﬁcation was completed, the ar-
ticles were examined to exclude “double counting” of the same event. In
addition, the articles were scanned to determine if there were multiple
events reported in one article. We systematically coded each event within
8 The event time frame could be as speciﬁc as “3 p.m. Wednesday,” or more general,
such as “last week.” We did not, however, collect prospective protest events, such as
a march or sit-in that is “planned for next week,” because such events may or may
not (and often do not) transpire. Additionally, we did not collect labor strike events,
which are not discrete occurrences but tend to be part of an ongoing cycle of protest.
9 A protest event, such as a sit-in at a Chicago City Council meeting, would, however,
be included. Although the regular meeting of the council is state initiated, such a
protest event is neither state sponsored nor state initiated.
10 They may be announced like civic events, but self-help gatherings, unlike a com-
munity festival or church pancake breakfast, focus on the individual and are typically
not open for public display and consumption.
11 Again, however, while regularly scheduled meetings (e.g., weekly church services)
are excluded, our theoretical scheme incorporates a wide range of nonroutine events
that might emerge from but are nonetheless logically independent of regular meetings,
such a church fund-raiser for AIDS victims, the public claim “PTA Seeks Ouster of
Principal,” a school’s ﬁftieth-year celebration, and special events like “PTA Dads’
Night.” These public events might be thought of as expressing “robust” mechanisms
of collective engagement not captured by meeting attendance.American Journal of Sociology
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an article based on a coding scheme that was pretested on independent
years of data.
12 Interrater reliability was established at both stages of the
data collection process: event identiﬁcation and event coding. Across per-
sons and sites, interrater reliability averaged90%.
13 Wecodedninedistinct
categories of information:
1. documentary information (e.g., date of article, event date),
2. event type (e.g., protest event, civic, or hybrid type),
3. frame of reference (e.g., national, state, city, neighborhood issue),
4. claims/purpose (speciﬁc nature and intent of event),
5. forms (e.g., a sit-in, march, community breakfast, fund-raiser),
6. location of event (by address, neighborhood, and/or municipality),
7. intensity (e.g., no. of participants, size, arrests, injuries, damages,
deaths),
8. event initiator information (e.g., community location and organiza-
tional type), and
9. event target information.
Classiﬁcation Rules
Based on our theoretical framework we classiﬁed each event as protest,
civic,o rhybrid. This classiﬁcation was accomplished by examining in
detail the claims/purpose of events, as well as their functional forms. We
deﬁne claims, for this project, as a demand for either a change in society
or an avowed desire to resist a proposed change. Forms, for this study,
are deﬁned as the mannerin whichaction isundertakenbyeventinitiators
(e.g., rally, sit-in).
We deﬁned protesteventsasanyevent“inwhichindividualscollectively
make a claim or express a grievance on behalf of a social movement
organization or social category” (Uhrig and Van Dyke 1996). A protest
event explicitly states a claim that includes a desire to bring about or
prevent a change in policy or services (e.g., civil rights and gender
equality). Protest events often take forms that are disruptive and conten-
tious in nature, but they are not limited to theseforms.Examplesofprotest
forms include rallies, sit-ins, and marches, as well as petitioning, letter-
writing campaigns, and class-action lawsuits. Protest events present a
12 One article could contain multiple events. For example, an article could report on
an antidrug march by teachers and parents and also report on parents/citizens dis-
rupting a school board meeting.
13 Reliability checks wereperformed atthebeginningandmiddleofthearticlecollection
and coding process, as well as any time a new person was added to the project team.
Interrater reliability ranged from 89% to 93%.Collective Civic Action
685
challenge to the existing social order and could entail violence (by pro-
testors or responding civil authorities). However, protests can also be
orderly and peaceful, as in symbolic displays or civil disobedience.
We draw the distinction between protest and civic events by noting
differences in their forms and claims/purposes. Examples of civic forms
include a rummage sale for a local church, a community breakfast, a local
cleanup day, or a charity ball. These are the more traditional forms of
civic life that Putnam claims have decreased in recent decades. Civic
events, in contrast to protest, do not have claims as much as purposes:
to celebrate the community (e.g., festivals), to procureresources(e.g.,fund-
raisers), or to accomplish collective goals (e.g., cleanups, preservation).
Civic events neither desire to bring about (or prevent) a change in policy,
nor are they the expression of a speciﬁc grievance, as is often the case of
protest events. We can also think of the difference between protest and
civic claims/purposes as follows: protest events have explicit claims while
civic events have implicit (or latent) purposes.
Perhaps most interesting to us theoretically are the hybrid events,which
represent a blend of civic and protest forms of action. More precisely,
such events typically combine civic forms with protest claims. They do
so by exhibiting a clear protest claim and/or grievance; however, instead
of a protest form (such as a march or rally), hybrid events exhibit a form
that is typically associated with civic action. An example of this sort of
event is a neighborhood art fair that doubles as a protest regardingcurrent
AIDS policy. In other words, claims of this sort grow out of traditional
forms of civic participation, not from social movement organizations or
from other organizations deﬁned in terms of their claims. Figure 1 depicts
our theoretical typology, or protest—civic—hybrid event framework,
along with summary deﬁnitions and concrete examples.
Event Methodology and Issues Unique to Our Study
A large literature examines the methodological challenges of using news-
paper event data, and many studies have investigated the reliability of
such data. Several rules of thumb have emerged with respect to protest
events: (1) national newspapers (e.g., the New York Times, Washington
Post) have a geographical bias toward coverage of national versus local
events, (2) newspapers are more likely to report events with greater size,
duration, or conﬂict, and (3) compared to ofﬁcial records such as protest
permits, newspapers underreport the number of events, but do report
larger events in which conﬂict occurred in central locationsorthatenjoyed
business sponsorship (see Snyder and Kelly 1977; McCarthy, McPhail,
and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Earl
et al. 2004). Some researchers have attempted to model explicitly andFig. 1.—Theoretical classiﬁcation and examples of three types of nonroutine collective action eventsCollective Civic Action
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subsequently “correct” for any perceived bias in newspaper data (Hug
and Wisler 1998; Meuller 1997). Others have countered that a formal
equation of sample selection bias cannot be estimated (Franzosi 1987, p.
8).
Our study addresses the challenges associated with the collection of
newspaper data by using the local newspaper of widest coverage as our
main source for events, employing a uniform sampling method across the
time period of the study, and following a strict protocol for event iden-
tiﬁcation and coding of information. Our study nonetheless introduces at
least two new issues to the methodology of newspaper event coding. The
ﬁrst, anticipated by Oliver and Maney (2000), is that we expand event
analyses to include not only less standard forms of protest but civic forms
such as fund-raisers, petition drives, and celebrations—exactly the type
of events that are systematically excluded from research on traditional
social movements. By including both civic and hybrid events we are able
to capture more fully the range of collective civic action.
A second issue raised by our study is that portions of the analysis rely
on coding the location of events in geographic space. Although scholars
have begun to champion the understudied spatial aspects of protest (e.g.,
Pile and Keith 1997; Miller 2000; Sewell 2001), previous research has not
explicitly modeled community-level variations in collective action coded
from newspapers. The question of geographical bias is related to the more
traditional issue of temporal consistency in coverage. Does the Tribune
cover certain neighborhoods more than others? Does the newspaper con-
sistently report events over time? There is evidence that newspapers
choose stories about protest based on their “newsworthiness” (McCarthy
et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Myers and
Caniglia 2004), but many civic events are not that newsworthy in the
traditional sense, and so the role of temporal and geographic bias is un-
known. Based on interviews with Tribune staff, along with an extensive
search for changes in newspaper policies toward civic reporting, we found
no evidence or reason to believe that particular times or particular neigh-
borhoods were systematically favored over others.
14 Because of the im-
portance of these issues, however, we devote a separate section of this
article to independent validation, especially the question of differential
14 For example, there is no evidence that the Tribune was systematically inﬂuenced by
what has been dubbed the “civic journalism” initiative funded by the Pew Center for
Civic Journalism from 1994 to 2002. This is a small, foundation-fundedinitiativebegun
in the early 1990s and aimed primarily at low-circulation newspapers.Haditinﬂuenced
the reporting of civic events, we would expect to see a dramatic rise of civic events
between 1990 and 2000. This is not the case. There was only a 1.4% increase in civic
events between 1990 (before the foundation initiative) and 2000. Perhaps more im-
portant, the Tribune was not funded by the Pew Trust under this initiative.American Journal of Sociology
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coverage by the racial composition of readership and community. Our
claim is not that our systematic sampling and coding scheme produced
an exact count, without error, but rather that we have achieved a credible
sample and representative picture of collective civic and protest events
for metropolitan Chicago during the period in question.
TRENDS AND PATTERNS
Figure 2 displays basic trends in collective action events in metropolitan
Chicago for the decade years of our study (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000),
disaggregated into the three broad categories of events. Thesecategories—
the deﬁnition and measurement of which we described in the previous
section—are protest, civic, and hybrid collective events.
The ﬁrst pattern worthy of note is that the general trend in protest and
civic action does not accord with claims regarding the monotonic decline
of social capital and civic life in the United States over the past three
decades. While there appears to have been a sharp decline in protest and
civic activity between 1970 and 1980, overall the picture for 1990 and
2000 is higher than in 1970, at or near the height of the New Left “protest
cycle,” suggesting a continuingvitalitytocivic/politicallifeinmetropolitan
Chicago that is at odds with the sobering account of many social capital
theorists.
15
The second general observation we wish to make concerns the distri-
bution of activity across our three event categories. Perhaps to thesurprise
of many steeped in the social movement tradition, protest—the “classic”
type of collective action—comprises but a small segment in our data. In
fact, civic events comprise nearly 80% of all events in Chicago over the
years in question, and protest comprises just 15%. Located between the
highly visible worlds of electoral politics (studied primarily by political
scientists) and sociological studies of social movements, the vibrant arena
of collective civic life lies largely invisible and yet accounts for the vast
majority of our events.
A third pattern concerns the increase in hybrid forms of social action
that combine traditional civic pursuits with claims making. Although the
15 Interestingly, the curvilinear pattern reﬂected in our event data is mirrored as well
in Rotolo’s (1999) analysis of trends in Putnam-style civic participation in voluntary
associations between 1974 and 1994. Although there is considerable variation across
types of associations, the modal trend looks a lot like ours, with a signiﬁcant dip in
participation in the 1970s and early 1980s and substantial recovery after that. In
another article we disaggregate protest trends by suburban and city locations, ﬁnding
a similar pattern (McAdam et al. 2005). Also, while the count of civic city events
declines in 2000, suburban events increase, with a net stability for the metro region
1970–2000.Fig. 2.—Collective event trends across decades, by type: Chicago metropolitan area, 1970–2000 ( ) N p 4,667American Journal of Sociology
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base prevalence of such events is low, it is notable that the percentage of
hybrid events increased from under 4% of the total counts in 1970 to over
12% in 2000, a more than threefold increase. Figure 2 clearly shows that
protest and hybrid are virtually dead even in 2000, whereas in 1970,
protests were relatively much higher.
Finally, it is important to our argument that the basic pattern in these
trends is not explained by variations in population change. Using census
data on population size for metropolitan Chicago by decade, wecalculated
the rate of civic engagement per 100,000 to be 13, 10, 14, and 12 in 1970,
1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, again a pattern of recovering stability
by century’s end. And the event rate of hybrid action more than doubled
from one per 100,000 persons in 1970 to over two in 2000. The data thus
seem reasonably clear that while the total volume and rate of collective
civic action events is more or less stable from 1970 to 1990–2000, the
proportion and rate of events that combine civic engagement with
movementlike claims has increased. We have no way of knowing, but
this merging or “blurring” of protest and traditional civic activity may
portend a new kind of social action that will become increasingly
important.
In table 1, we turn to the question of continuity and change in the
claims that inform collective action events and the forms they take.
Whereas ﬁgure 2 shows evidence of both continuity and change in the
overall structure of action, a careful disaggregation by speciﬁc claims will
allow us to take stock of changes in the extent to which claims are pre-
dominantly other regarding and aimed at the collective good. We are also
able to assess whether there have been shifts over time in forms of col-
lective action—for example, are community festivals and public meetings
relatively less common now than they were 30 years ago?
Overall, the claims data in table 1 paint a picture of considerable con-
tinuity in collective action events for ostensibly public-goods purposes.
The Spearman’s rank-order correlation from 1970 to 2000 is extraordi-
narily high, at .994. Across the decades, the predominant focus is charity,
which never drops lower than ﬁfth in the claim rankings. Education also
ranks consistently high, as do claims related to children, youth, and the
arts. Interestingly, the kinds of claims traditionally associated with social
movements, such as the environment, women’s rights, civil rights, and
housing, are not necessarily the top-ranked issues. With the exception of
the environment, these movement-type claims do not even rank in the
top ten.
What about forms of action? Although protest marches and rallies
dominate our image of collective action, the social capital narrative of
decline bemoans the loss of the simple public meeting. The data on forms
in table 1 demonstrate that the public meeting is alive and well. RankedCollective Civic Action
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TABLE 1
Stability and Change in the Ranking of Top 15 Claims and Forms by Decade:
Collective Action Events in Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1970–2000
All Years 1970 1980 1990 2000
Claims:
Charity-nonmedical research ....... 1 2511
Education (local) ..................... 2 1423
Culture/arts ........................... 3 5144
Youth/children ....................... 4 3367
Environment ......................... 5 4 14 5 5
Local/city government policy ....... 6 10836
Ethnic culture ........................ 7 9 2 12 9
Recreation/athletics .................. 8 NA 6 13 2
Religion ............................... 9 8 9 7 10
Women ................................ 10 12 11 8 NA
Community preservation ............ 11 NA 12 9 12
Housing ............................... 12 7 NA NA NA
Transportation ....................... 13 NA NA 15 8
Civil rights—African-American .... 14 11 13 14 NA
National government policy ........ 15 NA 7 NA 14
% claims within year* ............ 59.7 58.9 61.1 64.6 64.8
Forms:
Charity event ........................ 1 1212
Public meeting ....................... 2 2321
Community festival ................. 3 9433
Recreational activity ................ 4 8177
Lecture/talk/workshop/seminar ..... 5 6664
Ceremony ............................. 6 3 10 5 5
Conference ........................... 7 4588
Public hearing ........................ 8 13 12 4 11
Volunteer effort ...................... 9 10 NA 12 6
Rally/demonstration ................. 10 12 9 9 10
Awards/recognition dinners ......... 11 7 7 14 15
Ethnic celebration ................... 12 NA 8 11 12
Lawsuit, legal maneuver ............ 13 14 13 13 9
March ................................. 14 5 15 NA NA
Petition ............................... 15 NA NA 10 13
% forms within year* ............ 78.4 71.9 77.7 81.8 84.5
Note.—NA means this form was not in the top 15 for the given year.
* One event can involve multiple claims/forms: this table is for ﬁrst reported claim/form, excluding
unclassiﬁed claims/forms.
second in 1970 and ﬁrst in 2000, the public meeting as a form of collective
action consistently rises to the top along with charity events. Overall the
continuity in type of event form is considerable, with the Spearman rank-
order correlation coming in at .987.
The community festival is an interesting standout, however, climbing
steadily from ninth place in 1970 to the third-most-common form of col-American Journal of Sociology
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lective action in 2000. In reading the many narratives of the events on
which we collected data, it became clear that the community festival is
a broad-based form that allows a plethora of activities to ﬂourish—
including protest. One example of the versatility of the communityfestival
form was a Fourth of July community celebration that included a special
time set aside for a “human chain” composed of residents displaying signs,
t-shirts, buttons, and the like, advertising the causes they support. This
event would presumably raise awareness of the different issues supported
by members of the community and perhaps attract others to support the
same issues. Our data suggest that the community festival embodiesmany
of the other-regarding qualities that Putnam (2000) argues are
foundational.
COMMUNITY-LEVEL SOURCES OF COLLECTIVE CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT
We now shift gears and consider the second of our key motivating ques-
tions. What predicts variation in collective action events across com-
munities? We juxtapose competing perspectives on the social-organiza-
tional drivers of collective action events by capitalizing on a community
survey in Chicago that allows us to construct direct measures of local
social ties, organizational density, and membership in voluntary associ-
ations, which we then integrate with our newspaper event data. The
Community Survey of the Project on Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods (PHDCN) was conducted in 1995, when 8,782 Chicago
residents were personally interviewed in their homes. The basic design
for the survey had three stages: at stage 1, city blocks were sampledwithin
neighborhood clusters; at stage 2, dwelling units were sampled within
blocks; and at stage 3, one adult resident (18 years of age or older) was
sampled within each selected dwelling unit. Abt Associates carried out
the screening and data collection in cooperation with PHDCN, achieving
an overall response rate of 75% (see Sampson et al. 1997).
For the purposes of this study we link survey responses to one of the
77 community areas in Chicago, which each average about 38,000 in
population. Community areas are well known (e.g., the Loop, Lincoln
Park, the Near North Side, Hyde Park), widely recognized politically, and
often serve as boundaries for service delivery and allocation of resources
(Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1987; Suttles 1990). Theoretically, then, com-
munity areas are more appropriate as sites of collective action than census
tracts that are much smaller and often characterized by arbitrarilydeﬁned
boundaries. The mean sample sizes within community areas are also large
(1 100), which yields the crucial advantage of our being able to reliablyCollective Civic Action
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tap parameter variance between communities in institutional and social
interactional processes. More speciﬁcally, the community-levelreliabilities
of all survey-based measures described below are .70 or higher.
16
Organizations is a multi-item index thattaps thetotalnumberofsurvey-
reported local organizations and programs in the neighborhood—com-
munity newspaper, neighborhood watch, block group or tenant associa-
tion, crime prevention program, alcohol/drug treatment program, family
planning clinic, mental health center, youth center, after-school recrea-
tional programs for youth, counseling or mentoring services (e.g., Big
Brothers), crisis intervention center, and mental health clinicsforchildren.
Although a single survey errs on the conservative side in capturing the
volume of organizations, we believe that the systematic survey method-
ology, coupled with its broad range of coverage of community-based or-
ganizations that are typical in large cities (e.g., Warren 2004; Marwell
2004), produces a reliable and valid measure of between-community var-
iations in the density of institutional structures that are available for social
appropriation.
17
Civic membership in organizations was also recorded in the survey,
allowing us to create a scale of community-level associations and mem-
berships. Residents were asked whether they or a household member
belonged to (1) religious organizations, (2) neighborhood watch programs,
(3) block groups, tenant associations, or community councils, (4) business
or civic groups such as the Masons, the Elks, or the Rotary Club, (5)
ethnic or nationality clubs, and (6) political organizations such as a neigh-
borhood ward group. These are just the sorts of voluntary associations
and memberships emphasized by Putnam (2000); interestingly, they cor-
relate positively but very modestly ( , not signiﬁcant) with orga- r p .17
16 Community-level reliability is deﬁned as: , calibrating the preci-
2 S[t /(t j /nj)]/J 00 00
sion of measures, averaged across the set of J areas, as a function of (1) the sample
size (n) in each of the j communities and (2) the proportion of the total variance that
is between communities (t00) relative to the amount that is within communities (j
2).
For further discussion of “ecometric” measurement strategies see Raudenbush and
Sampson (1999).
17 Our measure also comports with external evidence and independent “local knowl-
edge” of the social organization of Chicago communities. On the latter, e.g., Hyde Park,
the neighborhood surrounding the University of Chicago, is usually considered one of
the most, if not the most, organizationally rich areas in the city. In our data, Hyde
Park is in the ninety-ninth percentile of the organizations scale. Only one community—
Beverly—scores (slightly) higher, and it, too, is known for its strong organizational
base (see Taub et al. 1987, pp. 184–85).American Journal of Sociology
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nizational density, permitting us to assess their independent contributions
to predicting collective action events.
18
We use the survey to assess two other key dimensions typically posited
as sources of local social capital—density of friend/kinship networks and
reciprocated exchange among neighbors. The measure of friend/kin ties
is based on the combined average of two measures capturing the number
of friends and relatives (each coded 0, 1–2, 3–5, 6–9, 10 or more) that
respondents reported living in their neighborhood. Reciprocatedexchange
is measured by a ﬁve-item scale tapping the relative frequency of social
exchange within the neighborhood. The items used were: “About how
often do you and people in your neighborhood do favors for each other?
By favors we mean such things as watching each other’s children, helping
with shopping, lending garden or house tools, and other small acts of
kindness.” (never, rarely, sometimes, or often). “How often do you and
other people in this neighborhood visit in each other’s homes or on the
street?” “How often do you and people in this neighborhood have parties
or other get-togethers where other people in the neighborhood are in-
vited?” “When a neighbor is not at home, how often do you and other
neighbors watch over their property?”“How oftendoyouandotherpeople
in the neighborhood ask each other advice about personal things such as
child rearing or job openings?” Taken together, these items tap the sorts
of personal networks and exchanges traditionally thought to underlie mo-
bilization capacity.
As control variables, we include predictive (1995) survey measures of
community-level socioeconomic status (SES, or scaleofincome,education,
and occupational prestige), racial composition (% non-Hispanic black),
and the aggregate level of violent victimization in the community. Pop-
ulation density (persons per kilometer) and population size from the 2000
census are also accounted for when modeling 2000 events. In assessing
social-organizational sources of collective action events we thus adjust for
key aspects of exposure (population), place stratiﬁcation, resources, and
social problems (see also Cohen and Dawson 1993). In separate validation
analysis we examined a number of other speciﬁcations (e.g., % Hispanic,
18 We believe the systematic methodology provides a good barometer of relative be-
tween-community variations in the intensity of membership in civic/voluntary asso-
ciations. To provide the broadest test of social-capital theory, our main results do not
restrict membership to groups located in, or holding meetings in, the immediate neigh-
borhood of the respondent because we are interested in variations at the larger com-
munity-area level (on average there are about 10 census tracts per community area).
Nevertheless, total memberships correlated with the more restricted measure of local
neighborhood memberships at ( ) across the 77 communities, suggesting r p .83 P ! .001
both measures tap the same propensity for civic membership. Not surprisingly, both
measures produced identical results.Collective Civic Action
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measures of police-recorded crime, and both poverty and racial compo-
sition measured from the 2000 census), but the results were virtually
identical, in large part because the 1995 survey accurately forecastscensus
2000 demographics. For example, in evidence of the survey’s represen-
tative design, the measure of % black in 1995 correlates with the inde-
pendent 2000 census measure at ( ). Because of the rela- r p .97 P ! .001
tively small sample size ( ) and lack of statistical power in the ratio N p 77
of cases to predictors in multivariate analysis, we prefer a parsimonious
model that is motivated by a small set of theoretically salient constructs.
Statistical Model for Event Counts
Three features of collective engagement in Chicago inﬂuenced our choice
of an appropriate statistical model: (1) the phenomenon is a count of rare
events, (2) we tested a Poisson model and found signiﬁcant heterogeneity
between communities in the latent event rates, and (3) the events are
spatially clustered by community areas. Although we cannot identify the
source of heterogeneity in our count data, we control for its presence
through an overdispersed Poisson (or a negative binomial) model (Barron
1992, p. 189). Speciﬁcally, we model the event count Yi for a given com-
munity as sampled from an overdispersed Poisson distribution with mean
, where ni is the population size in 100,000s of community i, and n ll ii i
is the latent or “true” collective action rate for community i per 100,000
people. We view the log-event rates as normally distributed across neigh-
borhoods, using a hierarchical generalized linear model approach to set
the natural log link equal to a mixed linear model that in- h p log(l ) ii
cludes relevant community covariates and a random effect for each com-
munity to reﬂect unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, we account for
the spatial clustering or nonindependence of events within communities
by estimating robust (Huber-White estimator) standard errors. Our ap-
proach thus conforms to the features of the data through estimation of
the log-event rate by a negative binomial count model (King 1988; Barron
1992) with adjustments for spatial clustering.
COMMUNITY-LEVEL RESULTS
We begin in table 2 with results for community-level variations in the
location of collective action events. We examine two sets of predictors in
a panel framework, with event counts in the year 2000 modeled as de-
scribed above. One set of predictors includes background structural fea-
tures in the form of SES, population density, race, and the violent crime
rate in the community (the latter of which is highly correlated with aTABLE 2
Event-Count Prediction Models of Chicago Collective Civic and Hybrid Social Action in 2000:
1995 PHDCN Survey of 77 Chicago Community Areas and CCCP Event Locations, 1990 and 2000
Collective Civic Events Hybrid/Blended Events
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Predictors Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio
Structural controls:
% black ........................... .85 (.68) 1.25 .47 (.54) .87 .41 (1.12) .37 1.32 (1.17) 1.13
SES ............................... 1.23 (.37) 3.33** .20 (.59) .34 1.56 (.32) 4.84** .38 (.63) .60
Violence ........................... 14.45 (5.87) 2.46* 5.36 (9.10) .59 23.52 (8.42) 2.79** 20.10 (7.49) 2.68**
Population density ............... .27 (.10) 2.54* .16 (.12) 1.30 .49 (.15) 3.38** .29 (.19) 1.53
Social-organizational factors:
Friend/kin ties ................... .87 (.84) 1.03 .84 (.74) 1.15 2.36 (1.06) 2.22* 1.48 (1.01) 1.46
Reciprocated exchange .......... 5.30 (1.63) 3.24** 1.99 (1.31) 1.52 3.39 (2.21) 1.53 1.17 (3.13) .37
Memberships ..................... .34 (.98) .35 .34 (1.19) .29 1.82 (1.14) 1.60 .91 (1.04) .87
Organizations .................... 2.38 (.50) 4.78** 1.97 (.39) 5.06** 2.78 (.99) 2.80** 2.78 (.92) 3.02**
Lagged 1990 events ................ .05 (.01) 4.32** 1.47 (.68) 2.17*
Model x
2 ............................ 76.55** 91.27** 114.69** 189.43**
df ..................................... 8989
*. P !.05
** P !.01.Collective Civic Action
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number of other compositional factors), all measured in 1995 and tem-
porally prior to collective action events. The second set of predictors
derives from our main theoretical model and includes friend/kin ties,
reciprocated exchange, civic memberships, and organizational density,
also measured in 1995 in the PHDCN community survey. The event
counts are normalized by population size.
We proceed by estimating models for the event counts that conform to
our theoretical categories of interest—collective civic engagement and
hybrid or blended social action. The results in model 1 of table 2 show
that organizational infrastructure, SES, low population density, and
higher rates of violent crime predict increased rates of both traditional
civic engagement and blended social action. Interestingly, however, the
indicator of friend/kinship ties is associated with lower rates of blended
social action, and reciprocated exchange is associatedwithlowercollective
civic engagement. Social and demographic featuresofcommunities,which
are explicitly controlled in the analyses, cannot explain these patterns.
Our panel model resolves temporal order, but there remains a concern
that we have left out important determinants of collective action corre-
lated with organizational infrastructure and the other signiﬁcant predic-
tors in model 1 (i.e., spuriousness). To assess this concern, we control in
model 2 for the volume of collective action events in 1990, a conservative
procedure when assessing the estimated effects of social-organizational
predictors measured at a later point in time. The reason is that the lagged
outcome may partial out previous effects of the predictors, and, hence, a
reduction of associations does not necessarily imply a lack of causal
salience.
The results of this rather strict control are nonetheless revealing on two
counts. First, the pattern of stability in collective action is surprisingly
robust across types of events—a consistent and signiﬁcant predictor of
collective engagement intensity in 2000 is the intensity of engagement in
1990, whether traditional civic or the newer hybrid form. This ﬁnding
serves as an indicator of the predictive validity of our data and as further
evidence of the continuity in collective civic engagement. Second, some
results change substantially after controlling for the baseline intensity of
collective action; for example, in both cases the role of socioeconomic
resources and population density diminishes completely, and neither vi-
olent crime nor reciprocated exchange now predict the most common
event type, collective civic engagement. Once prior activity is adjusted,
the only predictor of both traditional civic and hybrid social action is
organizational density.
19 These results support the idea that organizational
19 In addition to statistical signiﬁcance, the results conﬁrm the substantial magnitude
of association. A one-standard-deviation increase in organizational density is estimatedAmerican Journal of Sociology
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infrastructure is the largest and most proximate community-level factor
predicting the intensity of collective engagement of diverse types.
20
A critic might wonder whether we adequately tested our main thesis
when the outcome, as in table 2, reﬂects the location of collective action
events. Many of these events occurred in the Loop or downtown area
and may not reﬂect the social capital or collective efﬁcacy of the com-
munities that actually initiated the events. For example, a group on the
Far North Side of Chicago might regularly initiate protests or civic events
in the Loop, and we would be remiss not to reﬂect on such initiating or
generative capacity. We therefore collected additional data on the com-
munity location of the initiating organization or group responsible for
each event, regardless of where the event itself took place. We were able
to identify and geocode the initiating organization in approximately half
of all events given the descriptions in the newspaper, compared to an
87% location rate for the events themselves.Assumingthattheavailability
of initiator address information was distributed more or less randomly
across areas—which we examined, ﬁnding no evidence to the contrary—
we can subject our main results to a test of robustness.
We do so in table 3 by predicting events coded according to the com-
munity location of the initiating organization rather than by where the
events took place (as in table 2). Because of the much lower number of
initiator locations that could be geographically coded, and also the po-
tential differential reporting of organization locations by type of event,
we focus on the sum of hybrid, protest, and civic events. The modelresults
are crisp—collective engagement is predicted to increase threefold with
a one-standard-deviation increase in organizational density, controlling
the 1990 rate (t-ratio of 5.80, ; model 2). By contrast, SES, pop- P ! .01
ulation density, and violent crime fail to predict the intensity of initiating
activity once the prior rate of collective engagement is accounted for.
Friend/kin ties are irrelevant as well, and reciprocated exchange is as-
sociated with a modestly lower prevalence of initiating activity. Local ties
may promote the social control of crime (see Sampson et al. 1997) but not
to increase civic and hybrid rates of collective action by a factor of 2.7 and 4.07,
respectively, controlling for the lagged outcome and all other factors.
20 For comparative purposes we also estimated count models of protest. The main
predictor of 2000 protest events was lagged 1990 protest—in the full model none of
the social-organizational or demographic/compositional predictors were signiﬁcant at
. In a trimmed model focusing on memberships versus organizationsandholding P ! .05
constant lagged protest, organizational density was signiﬁcant at , but mem- P ! .10
bership was not. Although this evidence weighs in favor of our theoretical interpre-
tation, we are not inclined to place much weight on community variations in pure
protest. From a civic society perspective the main action is elsewhere, or at least to
be found in newer forms of hybrid action that draw on the protest narrative in creative
but heretofore unappreciated ways.Collective Civic Action
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TABLE 3
Event-Count Prediction Models of Chicago Collective Action in 2000 by
Location of Initiating Organization: 1995 PHDCN Survey of 77 Chicago
Community Areas and CCCP Initiator Locations, 1990 and 2000
Collective Engagement Events
Model 1 Model 2
Predictors Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio
Structural controls:
% black ............... .07 (.77) .09 .71 (.67) 1.06
SES ................... 1.38 (.37) 3.72** .01 (.45) .02
Violence ............... 12.55 (4.09) 3.07** 4.18 (3.90) 1.07
Population density ... .29 (.07) 3.91** .12 (.08) 1.50
Social-organizational
factors:
Friend/kin ties ....... .13 (.88) .15 .10 (.82) .12
Reciprocated ex-
change .............. 7.10 (1.79) 3.97** 4.00 (1.79) 2.23*
Memberships ......... .27 (1.07) .25 .35 (.96) .36
Organizations ........ 2.49 (.44) 5.67** 2.20 (.38) 5.80**
Lagged 1990 events .... .03 (.01) 4.31**
Model x
2 ................ 73.18** 135.29**
df ......................... 8 9
*. P !.05
** . P !.01
necessarily wider participation in collectiveeventsoraninstitutionalread-
iness to address political problems. Wilson’s (1987) concept of social iso-
lation is consistent with this interpretation, where dense local ties and
exchange foster a more parochial sense of community and attenuation of
collective or larger community-based initiatives.
21
An implication of our results is that protest and traditional civic par-
ticipation, although typically considered separately and by differentschol-
arly ﬁelds, share similar correlates. We probe this intriguing ﬁnding more
directly by mapping the community location of collective action events
according to our threefold typology. Are blended protest/civic events lo-
21 None of these results are sensitive to the statistical speciﬁcation of the overdispersed
Poisson model, conﬁrmed by substituting the logged event rate and estimating an
ordinary least squares regression for all models. We also checked for inﬂuential ob-
servations using standard regression diagnostics. Using logged rates, only model 2 in
table 4 produced a large outlier—the Loop—which was eliminated and the model
reestimated for this one case. The key results were replicated, and no major discrep-
ancies were obtained—the t-ratios for the estimated effects of organizations in model
2 of table 3 (with log-1990 rate controlled) were 3.23 for collective civic events and
2.45 for hybrid events. For table 4, model 2, the t-ratio was 3.34. In no case was civic
membership signiﬁcant.American Journal of Sociology
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cated in the same geographic areas as collective civic engagement? It is
not obvious that this should be the case, even given our results thus far.
To aid in further understanding, we map the density of collective action
events in 2000 against the backdrop of the organizational infrastructure
of communities, which our analysis has uncovered as an important in-
dependent predictor.
The results in ﬁgure 3 show a consistent and durable structural form
to events, whether they are rare protests or more common civic engage-
ments. Collective action events of all kinds, even hybrid action, tend to
occur in a relatively narrow band of communities characterizedbyadense
organizational proﬁle. Communities such as Hyde Park, Lakeview, and
the Near North Side (not just the Loop), for example, are rich in orga-
nizational life and generate many of the social action events. That the
organizational infrastructure of these areas matters above and beyond
their population composition, SES, and density of personal ties was re-
vealed in tables 2 and 3. The pattern in ﬁgure 3 therefore conﬁrms not
only the spatial overlap and concentration of diverse collective action
events, but also their common origins in institutional infrastructure.
It is also of interest that communities such as Hyde Park and Uptown,
while at or near the top in organizational infrastructure, sit much lower
on the scale of traditional civic memberships, further supporting our con-
tention that the prevalence of membership is distinct from the breadth
or density of organizations. In fact, Uptown is in the bottom one-third of
the civic membership distribution. Other communities (e.g., Avondale)are
in or near the middle of the civic membership distribution but near the
very bottom of organizational density. The lowest-scoring “civic” neigh-
borhood in membership—Oakland—nonetheless fares rather well in the
organizational representation picture (seventy-second percentile). These
two dimensions of community social organization are conceptually dis-
tinct, and Chicago communities vary considerably in their joint proﬁles
of civic memberships and organizational density. Apparently, some com-
munities are able to achieve an active organizational life absent the dense
civic memberships of yesteryear. One of the reasons may be that mem-
bership in groups such as the Elks, the Rotary Club, and neighborhood
tenant groups are more aimed at instrumental goals tied to self-interest
than to the promotion of social goods (see also Kaufman 2003). Another,
perhaps more likely, reason is tied to the fact that corporate actors often
provide the economic underpinnings of local organizations, a pathway
distinct from civic membership (Taub et al. 1987, p. 184).Fig. 3.—Spatial distribution of organizational density and collective action events, by type: Chicago, 2000American Journal of Sociology
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Frames of Engagement
Another critic might be concerned about our broad conceptualization of
collective civic engagement, in the sense that so far we have not limited
our attention to strictly neighborhood-speciﬁc frames of social action. The
idea is that “many instances of protest are not rooted in either the neigh-
borhoods where they occur or in the neighborhood where the sponsoring
organization happens to be located. A peace vigil, an anti-nuclear dem-
onstration, many sorts of protests at city hall over a wide range of issues
. . . are not meaningfully treated as neighborhood events.”
22 This is true,
as by design we coded many events that imply a geographic and/or ju-
risdictional orientation that transcends the neighborhood in which they
occur or even in which the initiating organization is located. Although
our focus in this manuscript is not primarily protest, the general point
can be logically extended to hybrid and traditional civic engagement.
What is the frame of the event, and does it matter to our theoretical
approach?
Our response is twofold. First, we are interested at the most funda-
mental level not in the nature of, or changes in, the geographic/jurisdic-
tional orientation of events but in the variable capacity of neighborhoods
to mobilize collective action. In this sense, all events are created equal.
That is, regardless of their implied geographic orientation, our events
speak to the capacity of local actors togenerateemergentaction—precisely
the lacunae of the social movements ﬁeld. Whether the goals are primarily
local, citywide, national, or even international is less relevant to us than
the local time, energy, and effort that must be expended in organizing
and carrying out the event. Our data reveal the sources that help produce
this social action.
Second, the question is ultimately an empirical one that we can address
because of the nature of our coding scheme.Foreachevent,wecategorized
the “frame” or purpose of the event that in most cases could be classiﬁed
in terms of its geographical or substantive reach. This analysis revealed
that “local neighborhood” frames (e.g., a street cleanup, a fund-raiser for
a local school playground) and “city” frames of reference (e.g., a meeting
to debate policy on deconcentrating poverty in the city’s public housing
system, a rally to protest distribution of city services) constitute 25% and
46% of the Chicago events, respectively.
23 To gain further insight into the
sources of these more local issues, we disaggregate model 2 in table 2 by
neighborhood and city frames. Because of the markedly reduced sample
22 As quoted from an anonymous AJS reviewer, whom we thank for his or her insight.
23 The other categories are state (5%), national (16%), and international (7%). For
example, a march against apartheid in South Africa would have been coded as inter-
national in framing.Collective Civic Action
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size of events, we analyze the sum of hybrid and collective engagement
events. Given the more localized framing of city and neighborhoodevents,
we also examine civic memberships speciﬁc to local neighborhood asso-
ciations (see n. 18).
The results in table 4 show remarkable similarity with the overall pat-
tern obtained previously. Whether neighborhood-speciﬁc or a citywide
framing of events, the density of local and interpersonally produced social
capital, in the form of friend/kin ties, neighborly exchange, and civic
memberships, proves ineffective (substituting total civic membership pro-
duced equivalent results). The structural controls are inconsistent and
again largely insigniﬁcant, with the exception of a negative association
of SES with neighborhood, but not citywide, events. By contrast, other
than lagged 1990 events, the density of community-based organizations
is the only consistent predictor of collective civic engagement in events
with local or citywide frames.
CIVIC ACTION AND THE RACIAL DIVIDE
There are, of course, limitations to our analytic approach. We have ad-
dressed methodological challenges the best we could at each step along
the way, but acknowledge that the uncharted territory of our data brings
with it the potential for error. Franzosi (1987) has argued that researchers
assessing newspaper data focus too narrowly on reliability,whichweagree
is often not the problem. Like Franzosi (1987, p. 5), we believe the bigger
issue concerns validity—in our case, potential bias in what the newspaper
measures tap across time and neighborhood. In particular, are better-off
white neighborhoods more likely to be covered by the Tribune than inner-
city, disadvantaged areas? Were the trends we discovered driven by
changes in Tribune editorial policy rather than by real change? To address
these questions and the limitations of our main set of data, we undertook
an additional research project with two goals in mind. One was to verify
the broad temporal trend in collective civic events found in our Tribune-
based analysis, and the second was to examine an independent source of
neighborhood collective action events that is sensitive to the racial divides
that seem so salient in Chicago. The latter is critical, as we are attempting
to address nonspurious variations between communities in collective
action.
Our analytic strategy was to maximize differences in newspaper struc-
tural organization, ideology, and editorial policies, all while maintaining
a focus on coverage across multiple communities in the Chicago metro-
politan area. Neighborhood newspapers were thus ruled out, as were
purely suburban newspapers. The largest-circulation newspapers in Chi-American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 4
Lagged Event-Count Prediction Models of Chicago Collective Civic and
Hybrid Social Action in 2000 by Event Frame: 1995 PHDCN Survey of 77
Chicago Community Areas and CCCP Event-Count Locations, 1990 and 2000
Predictors
Events with a
Neighborhood Frame
Events with a
City Frame
Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio Coefﬁcient (SE) t-Ratio
Structural controls:
% black ............... .76 (.61) 1.25 .13 (.90) .14
SES ................... 1.14 (.47) 2.43* .54 (.67) .82
Violence ............... 7.07 (3.67) 1.93 2.49 (6.51) .38
Population density ... .23 (.10) 2.35* .25 (.14) 1.84
Social-organizational
factors:
Friend/kin ties ....... .51 (.53) .96 1.09 (.86) 1.26
Reciprocated ex-
change .............. 3.49 (2.03) 1.72 3.27 (2.05) 1.59
Memberships
a ........ .27 (1.21) .22 1.33 (1.23) 1.08
Organizations ........ .78 (.33) 2.36* 2.62 (.54) 4.82**
Lagged 1990 events .... .04 (.01) 4.72** .03 (.01) 2.64**
Model x
2 ................ 113.21 71.68
df ......................... 9 9
a Memberships speciﬁc to groups in respondent’s local neighborhood.
*. P !.05
** . P !.01
cago other than the Tribune are the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago
Defender. The Sun-Times is in many respects a smaller, more tabloidlike
version of the Tribune, whereas the Defenderisthe nation’soldestAfrican-
American newspaper, not just a venerable and well-known institution in
Chicago, but “the most important black metropolitan newspaper in Amer-
ica” (Grossman, Keating, and Reif 2004, p. 134). The Defender is explicitly
designed to serve the needs of an African-American readership, but its
coverage is still metropolitan-wide, giving us leverage to see if a different
picture emerges of collective action events than in the Tribune. Chicago
is a racially divided city in many ways, and in some quarters, the Tribune
is seen as a conservative newspaper that reinforces this divide by pan-
dering to elite interests. Yet in principle, all African-American commu-
nities (as distinct from events) should be covered in the Tribune,s ot h e
Defender offers a strategic advantage over the Sun-Times for examining
biased coverage of collective action in the large and predominantly black
communities of Chicago’s West and South Sides. The key question is
whether both newspapers are capturing the common capacity of com-
munities to generate collective action events, initiating organizations, or
both—even if contaminated by a racialized lens of reporting.Collective Civic Action
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To ascertain if our main conclusions hold up to this kind of external
validation we collected additional data from the Defender using the same
basic criteria as we did for the Tribune, but with necessary differences in
sampling and temporal coverage. The Daily Defender was not universally
available on microﬁlm for all days and years in our libraries, so rather
than sampling every third day we collected each weekend edition. To
make the validation project manageable we also collected two types of
data. One was a simple aggregate total of Defender-reported events in
metro Chicago for 1970, 1980, and 1990 for all 12 months of each year.
Second, we selected a sample of four months (January, March, July, and
October) from the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 to be read in detail
and coded. Because of the much smaller number of events examined in
the Defender compared to the Tribune, along with the shorter four-month
window for city events, we focus on total collective action (hybrid,protest,
and civic) for both event and initiator location.
The ﬁrst question is straightforward. What is the trend in collective
action events over time? The number of collective action events as re-
corded by the Defender is remarkably consistent with the Tribune pattern
over the three-decade period. The total number of Defender events in the
Chicago metropolitan area in 1970, 1980, and 1990 are 548, 342, and 532,
respectively. Thus we see a dip from 1970 to 1980, followed by a recovery
in 1990. In fact, the overall tally is approximately the same in 1970 and
1990, very similar to the pattern for the Tribune (cf. ﬁg. 2). Because of
its larger black readership base, the city of Chicago is the more critical
test, however. Yet the patterns are identical for both raw counts and rates.
Notably, the Defender event rate in Chicago per 100,000 residents is 5.06,
3.46, 4.96, and 5.97 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively. Despite
the very different nature of the two newspapers, then, the data are con-
sistent and paint a picture of the relative stability of collective civic en-
gagement when we compare 1970 and 1990/2000, with 1980 the aberrant
“down” year.
The second and perhaps more important issue addressed in this study
is the distribution of collective action events across communities. To
achieve consistency with our Tribune-based analysis, we geocoded all
Defender events in Chicago to the city’s 77 community areas. As expected,
the Defender reports more events in African-American communities than
does the Tribune. For example, traditional black communities like Doug-
las, Grand Boulevard, and Englewood rank in the top 10 communities
for the Defender but not the Tribune. Communities like the Near West
Side, the Loop, and the Near North Side nonetheless rank highly across
both newspapers, indicating some continuity in geographic perspective.
To measure this more precisely, we calculated Pearson correlation coef-
ﬁcients of association across communities for each decade. The correla-American Journal of Sociology
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tions of Tribune and Defender counts were .84, .79, .85, and .67 for 1970,
1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively (all ), revealing a high level of P ! .01
overall agreement; the per capita rates were also all signiﬁcantly positive.
We learned earlier that event counts are highly skewed, however, with a
handful of communities like the Loop dominating the overall count, and
most communities recording no events. We thus calculated nonparametric
Spearman correlations to detect rank-order agreement for each decade
and for the aggregate total. Each was signiﬁcant, with the aggregate
coefﬁcient (r) across the three decades at .40 ( ). We conclude that P ! .01
while the Defender reports more events in the black community, more or
less by its charge, the overall level of concurrent agreement with the
Tribune is surprisingly consistent across time and space.
The question remains, however, as to how well the two newspapers
match up at the event level. It could be the case that the correlations are
positive because each newspaper is reporting more or less the same pool
of events. Or, perhaps more interesting, it could be that the newspapers
are tapping into the same capacity of neighborhoods to generate social
action, but with a different mix of actual events underlying the pattern.
To gain leverage on this issue we matched speciﬁc events, with the results
conﬁrming both scenarios but with a deﬁnite leaning toward the second.
In particular, the Defender was much more likely than the Tribune to
cover collective civic events in smaller African-American churches on the
South and West Sides, whereas the Tribune’s coverage in the black com-
munity ran more to larger middle-class churches and larger, politically
visible events. Still, 18% of Defender events from 1970–2000 were
matched exactly in the Tribune.
24
We then examined a model in which variations in Defender-based col-
lective events in 2000 were predicted by a function of % black, % poverty,
and population density in 1990, along with the rate of total collective
engagement as recorded in the Tribune. If racial or economic composition
accounts for signiﬁcant bias in reporting, this model should reveal a weak
or insigniﬁcant predictive role for the Tribune. By contrast, if the two
data sources tap common variance in the rate of collective action, then
even when controlling for racial and economic composition of community
(and hence readership), the Defender and Tribune should converge. In the
resulting equation the coefﬁcient for the 1990 Tribune yielded a t-ratio of
6.52 ( ); speciﬁcally, a one-standard-deviation increase in the Trib- P ! .01
24 Examples of event overlap include Martin Luther King Day celebrations in January
(four matches in 1970 and three in 1980), Operation PUSH events, fund-raisers for
UNICEF, a protest over the Contract Buyers League, the Chicago Consular Ball,
Hyde Park’s Fourth of July Picnic, and an art fair in Lawndale.Collective Civic Action
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une rate is associated with nearly half a standardized unit increase in the
Defender event rate, adjusting for poverty and % black.
For a ﬁnal set of critical tests we turn to this article’s main hypothesis
on the organizational sources of collective civic engagement. To assess the
generality of ﬁndings we estimated an exact replication of the statistical
model and variable speciﬁcation in table 2, model 2, but with theDefender
count of collective civic events in 2000 as the outcome. As expected,
% black had a signiﬁcant effect on predicting the event rate as reported
in the Defender, whereas it did not for the Tribune. However, in all other
substantive respects the results were replicated. The key result was that
civic memberships, dense ties, and reciprocal exchange all failed topredict
black civil society as measured by the Defenderreportsofcollectiveaction,
whereas the estimate for organizational density was positive and signif-
icant (t-ratio p 3.49 and 2.19 for initiator and event location rates, re-
spectively). Taking another perspective, we estimated a principal com-
ponents analysis of the initiator and event location rates for both the
Tribune and the Defender. Only one component was extracted from the
data, and all loadings were over .80, yet another indicator that the two
newspapers are tapping common variance in an underlying dimension of
collective action capacity—whether initiator based or event location
based. When we then estimated thepredictorsofthisprincipalcomponent,
the now basic result obtained: in the replication of model 2 in table 2,
the three traditional social capital measures were null. Organizational
density, by contrast, directly predicted the common variance in collective
civic action (coefﬁcient p .59, SE p .26, ). P ! .05
In short, there is broad relative agreement on the ecological concen-
tration and organizational sources of collective civic action when com-
paring the Tribune and Defender even when the manifest events differ.
Given the divergent nature and organization of the two newspapers, we
believe this is a sociologically interesting point, one that lends validity to
our earlier results and the underlying argument. Note that our analytic
strategy was divided into two fundamentally different questions—trends
over time for the entire Chicago metropolitan area, and predictors of
collective action events across communities of Chicago in 2000. The dif-
ferential error structures in the design mean that the results taken as a
whole are unlikely to have been generated by a common ﬂaw; potential
bias in counts over time (1970–2000) is very different than potential biases
across communities at the same time (2000), and, moreover, the Defender
is very different in nature than the Tribune. We now consider the general
implications of these results, which although different in constituent re-
spects, yield a consistent and, we believe, important picture.American Journal of Sociology
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IMPLICATIONS
The study of politics has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. In
the 1960s and 70s, studies of voting and other forms of traditional civic
participation were common, whereas research on social movements was
a blip on the radar screen. Today the reverse is true. The study of social
movements is a large and thriving subﬁeld in the social sciences; the study
of voting—with important exceptions like Brooks and Manza (1997) and
Manza and Brooks (1997)—has waned, as has research on “low-visibility”
civic events. Yet our data show that only 15% of collective action in
Chicago during the study period is of the social movement—or protest—
variety. Our results thus support a renewed emphasis on the civic sector
in the United States, perhaps especially the nexus of voluntary and non-
voluntary organizations (e.g., Ayala 2000).
An even more direct challenge to social movement scholars would ap-
pear to come from the changing nature of movement activity itself. Al-
though the literature tends to equate movement activity with disruptive
protest in the context of loosely coordinated national movements waged
by disadvantaged minorities, our study fails to conﬁrm this stylized pic-
ture. Protest and collective civic engagement events tend to be over-
whelmingly mundane, local, initiated by relatively advantaged segments
of society, and devoid of major conﬂict. Conditioned to view movements
as highly contentious and disruptive national struggles on behalf of the
disadvantaged, it appears movement analysts have largely missed this
interesting, mostly local, and far more moderate form of social action (see
also McAdam et al. 2005).
Of further interest is the trend in our data toward ever-greaternumbers
of hybrid events, or what we call “blended social action.” These are events
that essentially combine traditional civic forms of action with movement-
style claims. Indeed, most of the overall rise in events since 1980 appears
to be associated with this type of social action. Steeped in studies of the
sixties—or “sixties-style”—struggles, movement scholars will need to do
a better job of studying all manner of contemporary forms of action if
they are to understand the changing face of contention in the United
States. This conclusion accords well with the recent—although largely
speculative—writings on the growing institutionalization of protest that
has created a “movement society” in America (Meyer and Tarrow 1998;
Tarrow 1998). To some observers (McAdam 2003), this changing form of
protest has simultaneously routinized and tamed the social movement as
a form of social change advocacy. Our ﬁndings on the sharp rise in “hybrid
events,” along with the nondisruptive nature of protest more generally
(McAdam et al. 2005), are consistent with this view.Collective Civic Action
709
From Bowling to Social Action
Finally, what do our results suggest about Putnam’s (1995, 2000) work
and, more generally, about the limits of the empirical and conceptual
terrain on which much of the social capital–civil society debate has been
waged? Most obviously, the trend in Chicago-area collective action over
the past 30 years does not mirror the pattern adduced by Putnam and
others from mostly individual-level trends. Instead of a steady decline
over the period, we see a marked drop in collective action events between
1970 and 1980, followed by an impressive “recovery” in 1990, a pattern
revealed in both the Chicago Tribune and the very different Defender.
The Tribune totals in 1990 and 2000 also exceed those for 1970, which is
all the more impressive given the high levels of protest activity—antiwar,
women’s movement, environment—we associate with 1970. We recognize
that our research is limited to metro Chicago and thus cannot strictly
bear on national trends (but see Rotolo 1999). Still, the question lingers:
Why do the trends not match?
Our answer is clear: these trends don’t have to match, and in some
respects, the expectation that they should betrays a certain theoretical
predilection. Indeed, to infer the health of civic society from group mem-
bership, regular meetings, and dense social ties builds on the proposition
that collective action is aggregated out of large reservoirs of individuals
who are predisposed to social and civic participation. We offer instead a
conceptual framework grounded in the institutional origins of movement
activity—the prospects for collective action are powerfully conditioned
by the presence of established social settings within which emergent mo-
bilization can occur. From this view collective civic action does not, in
any simple sense, emerge or grow directly from individual memberships
and dense social ties. Our results conﬁrm that in accounting for com-
munity-level variations in both civic and hybrid collective action events,
the organizational infrastructure of the neighborhood matters a greatdeal,
and civic membership much less, if at all.
Our takeaway on Putnam (2000) is thus that we are looking at a dif-
ferent phenomenon that need not have the same correlates or trends, and
that may even be more consequential for civil society than traditional
forms of civic membership.
25 There is hope in this perspective, for it
suggests new organizational forms and strategies that can draw in indi-
25 A further implication, one that we plan to explore in future work, is that membership
activity is important insofar as it is mediated through speciﬁc organizational routes
or institutional settings. We also plan to examine in more depth how participation in
different kinds of public meetings, which Putnam (2000, e.g., p. 43) measured with
survey data, is in fact related to variations in stated claims and hybrid forms of
collective civic action.American Journal of Sociology
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viduals for collective pursuits. In fact, Putnam’s new work (Putnam and
Feldstein 2003) might be read in this context, for we ﬁnd it notable that
his examples of successful community building all revolve around insti-
tutional or organizational structures, from a community newspaper in
Mississippi, to branch libraries in Chicago,toaneighborhoodorganization
in Boston, to a church in Southern California.
Another example is seen in Skogan and Hartnett’s (1997) and Fung’s
(2004) descriptions of community policing in Chicago, where “beat meet-
ings” bring together residents and the police to address local problems.
Residents did not spontaneously begin attending beat meetings as a result
of local social ties; rather the meetings had their origin in a structural
initiative—by organizing, hosting, and supporting beat meetings, the po-
lice created an equal opportunity for involvement across the city. In dis-
advantaged neighborhoods with few indigenous secular organizations,
residents typically have fewer opportunities for involvement in anticrime
efforts (Skogan 1988), but when they do, residents are at least as likely
to be involved as residents of better-endowed neighborhoods. In an in-
teresting way, Chicago’s policing program has evened the playing ﬁeld
with regard to opportunities to participatein communitygovernance,with
the greatest increase in collectiveparticipationseenbyAfrican-Americans.
As Fung (2004) argues, designed institutions of “participatory democratic
governance” such as these can spark citizen involvement that in turn
generates innovative problem solving and public action.
On a general level, our interpretation also shares an afﬁnity with Skoc-
pol’s (2003, 2004) macrohistorical argument that American democracy
has undergone a civic reorganization rather than simple decline. Para-
phrasing Skocpol (2004, p. 4) for our case, community-basedorganizations
concentrate resources, voice, and clout in collective civic engagement—
so we should care as much about the organizational as we do about the
individual level of memberships and politics. This argument further im-
plies that local initiatives will falter absent stateororganizationalbacking,
consistent with our results on the community-basedorganizationalsources
of collective action.
CONCLUSION
We believe we have identiﬁed a fruitful new theoretical approach and
novel empirical strategy for tackling fundamental questions about the
nature and changing structure of civic life in the modern city. Our results
on collective action in Chicago over the past 30 years justify conﬁdence
in an event-focused approach that gives priority to variations across time
and space in civic actions that bring people together for a common andCollective Civic Action
711
speciﬁc purpose. In essence we are proposing an “extra-civic” or robust
mechanism of collective engagement in the form of nonroutine events that
are not initiated by the state or by political professionals, but by collec-
tivities motivated by a particular issue to act together in public (i.e., civic)
space. Our demonstration of the ecological concentration and organiza-
tional sources of these collective events, along with the related discovery
of increasingly blended social action, further suggest not only that robust
civic engagement is inadequately explained by individual-level processes,
but that it may be unfolding differently than in earlier eras. From this
view, collective civic action has not declined; rather, what we have looked
to as the traditional indicators of civic participation have declined while
the nature of participation in collective events has changed. One might
think of this as “changing continuity” in collectivecivicengagement.Com-
bining civic forms with stated claims for social change may be a harbinger
of the future, especially in an increasingly organizational society where
time constraints on traditional social ties and individual memberships are
severe.
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